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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper focuses on the recent evolution of global regulatory policy agendas in two 
key parts of communication media: the Internet and telecommunications. It explores 
the key regulatory governance ideas and practices that have come to the fore in 
shaping these fast-moving policy arenas, commenting in the process on the place of 
regulatory competition and cooperation therein. It places particular focus on how, in 
different ways, selected global institutional contexts have played vital roles in shaping 
telecommunications and Internet policy agendas and the implications of this. In doing 
so, it explores a number of key junctures in the evolution of regulatory policy at the 
international level, highlighting the positions of Northern and Southern states at 
moments of policy change. The paper‟s findings tend to underpin the assertion that 
sectoral internationalisation in telecommunications and the Internet have reinforced - 
rather than created a context for change in - the traditional order of North-South 
relations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper focuses on the recent evolution of global regulatory policy agendas in two 
key parts of communication media: the Internet and telecommunications. It explores 
the key regulatory governance ideas and practices that have come to the fore in 
shaping these fast-moving policy arenas, commenting in the process on the place of 
regulatory competition and cooperation therein. Though related (through their 
function of providing means of electronic network communication) the Internet and 
telecommunications have very different origins and evolutionary histories, making the 
recent period of internationalisation of each interesting from a comparative 
perspective. For both Northern and Southern states, telecommunications has strong 
historical foundations at the national level. This influenced not only the 
developmental character of telecommunications domestically but also shaped 
perspectives on, and operational arrangements for, international telecommunication. 
Nevertheless, as the paper shows, within the last 25-30 years there have been 
transformative developments in the nature of telecommunications in both these 
respects across the globe shaped by policy agendas prosecuted at the international 
level. The Internet, by contrast a much more recent development, has grown rapidly 
„outwards‟ internationally from the USA. The task of developing a regulatory 
governance system at the international level for it has been prominent though is still 
very much a work in progress. 
 
Taking each case, the paper explores the policy ideas and practices which have come 
to prominence as the internationalisation agenda has taken hold. It places particular 
focus on how, in different ways, key (sometimes new) global institutional contexts 
have played vital roles in shaping telecommunications and Internet policy agendas 
and the implications of this. In doing so, it explores a number of key junctures in the 
evolution of regulatory policy at the international level, highlighting the positions of 
Northern and Southern states at moments of policy change. The paper‟s findings tend 
to underpin the assertion that sectoral liberalisation and internationalisation have thus 
far in respect of telecommunications and the Internet reinforced - rather than created a 
context for change in - the traditional order of North-South relations. In 
telecommunications, the core features of the policy agenda originating from key 
Northern States that advocated liberalisation and international market opening have 
been adopted globally, as witnessed in institutional contexts such as the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). This 
process has often been facilitated through regulatory cooperation aimed at learning 
the disciplines of neo-liberalism through policy diffusion, though also in the case of 
the WTO due to the hard enforcement potential of the Disputes Settlement Procedure. 
The paper argues that, despite the remarkably broad adoption of the neo-liberal model 
for telecommunications worldwide through policy emulation, the role of regulatory 
competition has thus far been limited given the still predominantly inter-national 
nature of the sector. In Internet governance, Southern States have played only 
marginal roles in processes of new institution shaping and evolution, despite moments 
of contestation, exemplified in the debates on the future of the Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and in the World Summit on the 
Information Society (WSIS) process. The paper argues that a key institutional product 
of the latter, the multi-stakeholder Internet Governance Forum (IGF), whilst 
possessing innovative governance characteristics, has proven a relatively weak 
instrument for addressing this problem. 
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INTERNATIONAL POLICY AGENDAS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
For most of the 20
th
 century, telecommunications systems were organised on the basis 
of state-controlled and state-run service monopolies. The very time-consuming and 
costly task of constructing mostly cable based telecommunications infrastructure 
meant that the reach and performance levels of telecommunications systems varied 
greatly, even within the economically most affluent regions of the world. The 
international character of the sector in terms of service provision was limited for the 
most part to commercial interface agreements between national telecommunications 
carriers, the rates for which were devised in a cartel-like fashion within the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), as well as cooperation on the 
production of technical standards. The telecommunication equipment production sub-
sector displayed more of an international character, for developing countries often in 
the form of (ex) colonial firm foreign direct investment and ownership (see Goransson 
1992).  
 
However, as has by now been extensively catalogued in the academic literature, over 
the course of approximately the last 30 years, this state-centric, monopolistic policy 
model for telecommunications has been abandoned and replaced by one of regulated 
competition. Given the steady evolutionary history of telecommunications, this 
change has been both swift and extensive. The new policy model, like its predecessor, 
has clear ideological underpinnings, stressing the superiority of market forces in the 
delivery of communications services over public provision by the state, couched in 
the context of economic globalisation (Cerny 2008). However, more importantly, this 
neo-liberal policy model in telecommunications has developed through time a clear 
set of structural and operational features based on public regulation of a new set of 
competitively ordered telecommunications markets. The sources of change in 
telecommunications emerged, predictably, from the Northern hemisphere. The 
liberalisation (through the introduction of competition) of regulated and already 
privately-based telecommunications services in the USA from the mid-1980s was 
highly significant though arguably far from path-breaking. However, the introduction 
of competitively ordered markets governed by a series of independent national 
regulatory authorities in, first, the UK and then the remainder of the European Union 
certainly was. Both the EU and the US subsequently played prominent roles in 
promoting the agenda of regulated open market competition beyond their territories 
(see below). Through the last 20 years what emerged as a trend has developed into a 
full scale neo-liberal transformative movement, with states across most of the 
Northern and Southern hemispheres adopting a neo-liberal model of 
telecommunications.  
 
An early prominent indicator of the important role which international neo-liberal 
policy agendas developed in key international organisations would play in the  
transformation of telecommunications along neo-liberal lines was provided, albeit at 
the international regional level, by the European Union (EU). From the mid-1980s 
onwards, the EU became an increasingly important actor in the evolution of 
telecommunications across its Member States. Its international policy agenda had a 
number of dimensions. First, the EU produced  - by agreement of its Member States - 
a series of legislative measures mandating the liberalisation of, but also very 
importantly the harmonisation of regulatory practice within, key telecommunications 
markets. Second, the EU introduced a number of research and development and 
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regional aid packages aimed at enhancing the quality of telecommunications 
infrastructures and services across Member States. Third, the EU became a key actor 
in monitoring the implementation of the telecommunications regulatory package at 
the national level (Humphreys 2004). This has had a „hard‟ legal dimension in terms 
of the power of the European Commission and the European Court of Justice to 
ensure the adoption of agreed legislation. However, as important has been the role of 
the Commission in seeking information from national regulatory authorities and 
publishing subsequently reports detailing good (and at the same time inadequate) 
implementation and regulatory practice. The EU also established, in 2002, the 
European Regulators Group (now known as the Body of European Regulators for 
Electronic Communications), comprising members of national regulatory authorities 
whose aim is to share and adopt regulatory best practice. Finally, in its many policy 
statements produced over the years, the EU produced strong rhetorical support for the 
introduction and adherence to the neo-liberal agenda of international market opening 
and regulated competition in telecommunications (see Simpson 2009). Though much 
more difficult to achieve at the global level, many of these kinds of policy activities 
undertaken by the EU at a relatively early stage in the process of telecommunications 
liberalisation soon became evident in the work of the World Trade Organization and 
the International Telecommunication Union, to a consideration of which the paper 
now turns. 
 
INTERNATIONAL NEO-LIBERAL POLICY AGENDAS IN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS - THE INFLUENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
TELECOMMUNICATION UNION AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION  
 
The World Trade Organization 
The successful development of a policy agenda of regulated competition in 
telecommunications at the global level required focus on trade and trade-related 
matters. Here, its key advocates – the US and the EU – faced the difficult challenge of 
securing agreement to domestic and international telecommunications service 
provision among as many states as possible. Perceived as equally significant was the 
need to create liberal systems with few restrictions on international foreign direct 
investment in telecommunications services provision and indigenous service 
providers. Such efforts soon became an important part of the more general global 
trade liberalisation agenda of the Uruguay Round of negotiations as part of the 
General Agreement in Trade and Tariffs (GATT) 1986-94 in which there was a strong 
push by industrialised states for the creation of a trade in services liberalisation 
agreement. This proved successful in 1994 with the conclusion of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The GATS was accompanied by the 
announcement of the creation, at the beginning of 2005, of the World Trade 
Organization as a new global body for the administration of current agreements and 
the negotiations in future international trade and trade related matters. In those 
negotiations leading to GATS that took place on telecommunications trade 
liberalisation, Anglo-American technical or „epistemic‟ experts were prominent 
initially, whose often arcane work proved important since the „the very act of defining 
services transactions as “trade” established normative presumptions that “free trade” 
was the yardstick for good policy‟ (Drake and Nicolaidis 1992). The US in particular 
was keen to see an effective forum-shifting of negotiations on international call 
settlement rates take place from the ITU to global trade fora (Huntley et al. 1989) and 
went as far as to propose the liberalisation of international voice telephonic services, 
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withdrawn subsequently because of lack of support (Fredebul-Krein and Freytag, 
1997). In fact, the GATS produced a significant, though in retrospect only modest, 
trade liberalisation in Value Added Telecommunications Services (excluding voice 
telephony). Here, 48 states agreed schedules of commitments to liberalise 
telecommunications services across the 15 categories defined as a consequence of the 
negotiations (Drake and Noam 1997).  
 
The agreements made at the end of the Uruguay Round marked merely the 
commencement of a more aggressive push by the US and the EU to broaden the 
number of states committing to telecommunications liberalisation as well as to extend 
trade agreements to include all telecommunications services, most notably voice 
telephony. In this respect both parties aimed to „promote aggressively the transfer of 
ideas on telecommunications policy liberalisation, so avidly pursued in their 
jurisdictions, to the global forum of the WTO‟  (Humphreys and Simpson 2005: 132). 
Beyond that, the two years after the inception of the WTO marked an intense period 
of negotiation in which the Northern States, principally the US, EU, Canada and 
Japan dominated proceedings. This culminated in February 1997 in the landmark 
Agreement on Basic Telecommunications (ABT) where initially 69 states (later 
extended to 85) agreed to create competition in a range of telecommunications 
markets, including voice telephony.  
 
The ABT was equally significant in respect of the adoption by 57 of its signatories of 
the so-called Reference Paper whose elements became part of referenced 
commitments made by signatories of the ABT in their schedules of commitments 
taken (Luff 2004). The paper amounted to a framework of regulatory principles to be 
pursued in the process of compliance with the ABT which aimed to give expression to 
- and to shore up - the agenda of regulated market competition and open market 
access in telecommunications. The specifics of the Paper are dominated by the agenda 
formulated by the liberalisation forerunner states from the Northern hemisphere. Here 
issues such as dealing with anti-competitive behaviour, interconnection, licensing and 
regulatory independence form the basis of a set of neo-liberal disciplines to ensure the 
enforcement of the policy model of international regulated competition.  The Paper 
does, in contrast, commit signatories to maintaining universal service provision, albeit 
in a way that is competitively neutral (Blouin 2000) and mirrors closely ideas on the 
articulation of universal service as already developed in Northern neo-liberal 
telecommunications systems. It is important to note that the commitments made to 
liberalisation by each WTO member were not identical, highlighting the way in which 
the international neo-liberal policy agenda for telecommunications allows flexibility, 
albeit within clearly defined parameters such as those articulated in the Reference 
Paper. Particularly significant were commitments made in respect of voice telephony, 
the most widespread telecommunications service.  Here 55 states agreed to introduce 
competition in the local voice telephonic market whilst 52 states made commitments 
in respect of long distance voice telephony and a further 56 in respect of international 
voice telephony. A further 42 states permitted resale of public voice services. In terms 
of the establishment of commercial presence to provide telecommunications services 
through foreign direct investment, 27 governments immediately, and another 21 
mostly developing states by 2004, agreed to make liberalising commitments (Drake 
and Noam 1997: 803-4). 
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It is interesting to note that whilst the US was arguably the most forceful player in 
driving forward the liberalisation policy agenda in the WTO (see Singh 2008), the 
ABT – and in particular the Reference Paper  - tallied very closely with the policy 
model developed by EU states for telecommunications. In this respect, a sense began 
to develop through the 1990s that the international policy agenda for 
telecommunications was developing into a framework of European style managed 
liberalism rather than out-and-out deregulated marketisation (Drake and Nicolaidis 
1992). Overall, the creation of the WTO marked a highly significant moment in the 
development of neo-liberal international policy agendas in telecommunications. The 
goal of the WTO to liberalise international trade in goods and particularly services 
presented telecommunications as a tailor-made opportunity to exercise its influence 
shortly after inception. In so doing, it possesses hard enforcement powers enshrined in 
its Dispute Settlement Procedures. However, interesting the ABT has been subject to 
very few disputes, which provides an indication of the extent to which the systems of 
regulated competition entailed in the ABT have been complied with by signatories. 
 
A key goal of the WTO is to create mutually supportive relationships with other 
global bodies such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the 
World Intellectual Property Organization. This contributed to something of a loosely 
nested system of governance in telecommunications in which the disciplines of 
regulated competition could be transferred and learned, particularly by developing 
states (Simpson and Wilkinson 2002). As Drake and Noam (1997: 807) pointed out 
shortly after the signing of the ABT „the real significance of the...deal does not rest on 
how deeply countries have liberalised....What may matter more for the governance of 
the global information economy is that the deal signals the beginning of an 
evolutionary process of mutual adjustment that will unfold according to a clearly 
defined set of principles, baselines and mechanisms‟. Focusing on development, 
Drake (2009) somewhat optimistically argues that the WTO has „institutionalised a 
normative baseline against which governments and other stakeholders can undertake 
principled evaluations of the negotiation‟s conformity with development objectives 
and at least holds out the possibility of support and flexibility for developing 
economies‟.  
 
The International Telecommunication Union 
Whilst the creation of key trade and market access provisions in the WTO as part of 
the GATS was vital in setting the parameters of the neo-liberal international 
telecommunications policy agenda, the agreements could be questioned in terms of 
their lack of detail and thus ability to deliver (Fredebul-Krein and Freytag 1999). As 
noted above, the WTO possessed the potential to embed further the neo-liberal policy 
agenda through learning and „socialisation‟, though it also faced some challenges in 
so doing. Not least, the WTO was a new organisation which had emerged from an 
often fractious history of international trade negotiation, particularly between 
Northern and Southern states, in the areas of agriculture and textiles and clothing. An 
interesting feature of the last 15 or so years of international telecommunications 
policy in respect of this kind of activity has been the perhaps unlikely emergence of 
the ITU as a source of international organisational support for the reinforcement of 
the parameters of the model of international regulated competition. The recent role of 
the ITU can be regarded as highly significant for a number of reasons. First, it is a 
global telecommunications specific body with a wealth of technical expertise, 
stretching beyond that available to more generic bodies historically more closely 
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associated with the neo-liberal approach, such as the WTO and the World Bank. 
Second, the ITU is a relatively long-standing special agency of the United Nations 
and, beyond this, is one of the oldest international organisations, dating back to 1865 
as the International Telegraph Union. It has a very large membership of 192 states, 
including most from the Southern hemisphere. 
 
For most of the 20
th
 century, nevertheless, the ITU firmly represented what by the 
1990s had come to be viewed as the „old order‟ of international telecommunications. 
It was essentially technocratic in nature, dominated by the state owned 
telecommunications incumbents and did not hold strongly the neo-liberal imperatives 
of market based competition and regulation. Maclean (1999: 151) argues that „before 
telecommunications became a huge, largely private, competitive, fast–moving, global 
business, there was no compelling practical reason for the ITU to be any more than a 
place where experts from different countries could meet periodically to develop the 
standards and regulations needed to enable the growth of „inter–national‟ 
telecommunications networks and services‟. There is strong evidence that among the 
leading edge telecommunications liberalisers, not least the US and the EU, the ITU 
was viewed as a major organisational impediment to change. This was clearly 
manifest in objections raised by both parties to the system of international accounting 
rates historically formulated at the ITU. These rates, upon which bilateral 
international call charges were settled by incumbent telecommunications operators, 
historically bore little relation to the economic cost of providing the service and, thus, 
sat very uneasily with the idea of market-based, regulation-framed international 
telecommunications. They did, however, provide for developing economies, a source 
of much needed revenue. The system was also historically highly uncompetitive and 
dominated, cartel-like, by incumbent operators. 
 
However, the scope of the Northern State liberalisers in altering the ITU‟s agenda 
from an impediment to a proponent of neo-liberal telecommunications has become 
powerfully evident. Key developments noted above in international trade 
negotiations, not least the creation of a new global organisational context in the shape 
of the WTO, with its early expressed keen interest in telecommunications, exerted 
strong pressure on the ITU to embrace elements of the neo-liberal agenda. The ITU 
began to view itself as in danger of being downgraded in status, if not bypassed, in the 
newly emerging international telecommunications policy regime. As a consequence, 
from the mid 1990s onwards it began to transform itself into a body which not only 
embraced the international policy model of regulated telecommunications, but acted 
as a firm promoter of it. A key moment occurred at the 1994 ITU Plenipotentiary 
meeting where it was agreed that membership of the Union was to be opened up to 
private sector interests (the ITU now has as many as 547 non-state sectoral members 
from both public and private realms, though the vast majority of these are from 
private capital deeply supportive of the agenda of liberalisation). This weight of 
numbers, plus the increasing volume of the call of Northern states advocating neo-
liberal reform, laid the ground for a significant change in emphasis in the agenda of 
the ITU.  
 
As developments proceeded in the WTO leading to the 1997 ABT, the debate about 
liberalisation of the international call charging system continued apace. Here, the 
power of Northern liberalising states proved decisive. The ABT mandated for its 
signatories international resale of telecommunications, thus allowing new 
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international telecommunications service providers to enter the market for 
international calling, in the process circumventing and directly challenging the 
international call charging system created at the ITU. However, a key problem for the 
EU and the US was that the adoption of international simple resale services occurred 
in the richest OECD states for the most part. Thus, the US, with the tacit agreement of 
the EU, introduced a unilateral system of individually targeted international call 
benchmark tariff reduction schemes in an effort to drive call charges down. Since 
then, international call rates have dropped significantly as a liberalised international 
calling market has matured. 
 
In contrast to the fractious period of transition of most of the 1990s, the ITU has been 
for some years now a key international player in the cementing and development of 
liberalised telecommunications. Whilst it does not possess legislative or enforcement 
powers, its influence is arguably as important in other areas. Much of its work 
resembles that undertaken in the EU by the European Commission. For example, it 
has organised a series of global symposia for regulators. The latest of these resulted in 
the production of a set of best practice guidelines for the implementation and 
refinement of regulated competition in telecommunications. Focus was placed on the 
key regulatory problems which have become impediments to the business of trying to 
create effective international competition in telecommunications, such as open access 
to network facilities; network infrastructural upgrading to so-called Next Generation 
Networks; and stimulating access to new content based services in an increasingly 
convergent, Internet-focused communications network environment. The ITU has also 
produced regular data on the evolution of the global telecommunications market in the 
direction of liberalisation. Its Telecommunication Development Bureau, through a 
Regulatory Knowledge Centre, undertakes „the collection, analysis and dissemination 
of information on telecommunication regulatory trends and practices‟ (ITU TDB, 
2010). This focuses on the key range of indicators that have come to characterise 
liberalised telecommunications, dealing with such matters as the level of competition 
in key telecommunications markets; the existence (or otherwise) and characteristic 
features of regulation, in particular the presence of separate telecommunications 
regulatory authorities; the degree of foreign ownership permitted in key 
telecommunication markets; tariff policies; new service introduction plans; and 
criteria for establishing the existence of Significant Market Power. In providing this 
wealth of statistics from within its development arm, ITU-D, the ITU has come to act 
as major agent in the promotion and diffusion of the international policy agenda of 
telecommunications liberalisation through regulatory cooperation and information 
diffusion. As Chakravartty and Sarikakis (2006: 69) argue, the ITU has affirmed the 
message „to implement a comprehensive reform process that would enable 
competition and technological modernization, promising to balance the concerns of 
equity with those of efficiency. In theory, this included the deregulation of the state-
operated network with the ultimate goal of privatisation, liberalization of the supply 
of services and the separation of the government‟s policy and regulatory arm from its 
responsibility as a network operator‟. 
 
THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL POLICY AGENDAS FOR THE 
INTERNET  - ICANN 
In contrast to telecommunications, the Internet is one of the newest aspects of 
international electronic network communication. The Internet is unique in that for all 
states, arguably even the US, from which its key communications protocols – 
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Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) - originated, it did not 
possess the kind of long-standing national „centred-ness‟ characteristic of the 
development of telecommunications or broadcasting. Thus, as the Internet developed 
user-friendliness coupled with the original capacity to allow in theory any computer 
(or network) of whatever specification connected to it to communicate, it soon 
became envisioned as a tool with innate global communication potential. As a 
consequence of this, the development of a global system of governance for the 
Internet became from the mid-1990s onwards a high profile international 
communications policy agenda item. Given its strategic importance, the debate on 
Internet governance has often excited considerable controversy. Like in 
telecommunications, the international institutional context has been an important focal 
point.  
 
One of the most high profile aspects of the debate on the Internet has been the 
governance of its system of naming and addressing. This is, in simple operational 
terms, a technical and information storage and management set of functions. 
However, the system also bestows upon those parties in control of it the right to 
afford, deny or modify access to individuals or groups of users to the Internet. It also 
allows control over a vast quantity of key information on users connected to the 
Internet. Given the growing economic, social and political importance of Internet-
based communication and its perceived „border-lessness‟ and „internationality‟, the 
argument grew that the system of governance of what have come to be termed the 
critical technical resources of the Internet should be shared in an international 
organisational context among all the world‟s states. This, however, did not materialise 
as a result of a period of negotiation on creating a new international body for 
governing the Internet‟s address system that took place through the mid-to-late 1990s. 
The process led to the establishment, in 1999, of the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). ICANN is a unique global governance body 
in a number of respects since, operationally, it is private and not-for-profit whose 
relationship with states is arm‟s length, through a Governmental Advisory Committee 
(GAC). The most controversial aspect of ICANN, however, has been its unilateral 
oversight contractual relationship with the US government (through the Department 
of Commerce) (Mueller 2002; 2009).  
 
The establishment of ICANN according to this structure provided a clear illustration 
of the powerful exercising of US interests in the evolution of Internet governance. In 
this respect, the process leading to the creation of ICANN was contested though was 
not at the time illustrative of a North-South division of interests with a familiar 
prevailing of the former. Instead, the period is noteworthy for the way in which an 
original high profile alliance, called the International Ad-Hoc Committee, was by-
passed by the US government in the process leading to the creation of what became 
ICANN. The IAHC, through a Memo of Understanding produced in 1997, proposed a 
not-for-profit international body that would be headquartered in Geneva. However, 
the US government was concerned about the presence of the ITU in the IAHC, at that 
stage still viewing it as very much an „old order‟ state dominated communications 
body. The period is also illustrative of the very limited way in which the EU was able 
to secure its interests in the creation of ICANN. In particular, it was only able to 
secure the creation of the GAC as a much lighter touch advisory body than it would 
have preferred, though the latter‟s influence over the ICANN board has grown 
through time (Christou and Simpson 2011). Instead, the process leading ICANN‟s 
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creation was dominated by negotiations between US technical and business interests 
presided over by the US government.  
 
Drawn together, these features merely served to illustrate how far removed Southern 
states were from the initial process of institution building around the Internet. As has 
often been the case in the development of key international governance bodies for 
economic and technical resources, first mover advantage lay with the Northern 
hemisphere, something which has set the context for the subsequent evolution of the 
debate on Internet governance. The story of this differential access to a say in the 
evolution of governance of a key Internet institution can be put down, in considerable 
part, to a familiar technological lag in communications resources available to 
Northern and Southern hemisphere states in the Internet‟s development. However, in 
the years subsequent to ICANN‟s creation, as the significance of the Internet became 
increasingly apparent, the contested nature of this initial attempt to establish global 
Internet governance arrangements also materialised. An area of particular concern 
was ICANN‟s jurisdiction over the country code Top Level Domain (ccTLD) system 
through which, by dint of a two letter code, each of the world‟s states is able to allow 
Internet users to register their computers under. Here, complaints over the legitimacy 
held by ICANN were raised by developing states, notably Syria, not least in respect of 
its potential ability to remove particular users, and even a country in its own right 
should it wish to, from Internet communication. Some states, notably South Africa, 
even expressed interest in having its country code TLD re-designated to another 
international body and introduced legislation, in 2003, which aimed to reclaim its 
name space from the then ccTLD manager (Yu 2003). Another major area of concern 
has been ICANN‟s GAC. Initially a select body, the GAC‟s membership expanded to 
100 members by 2007, many from developing states, though at that stage it was 
estimated by the GAC itself that only about 40 members participated on a regular 
basis. The GAC also allowed the ITU observer status at its meetings (Christou and 
Simpson, 2008). However, it was the exclusive contractual relationship between the 
US and ICANN which proved most controversial in the eyes of many of the world‟s 
states, something which by the early part of the last decade motivated efforts to 
multilateralise governance control of Internet addressing. This emerged in the context 
of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) to an analysis of which in 
respect of its effects on international policy agendas and initiatives for the Internet, 
the paper now turns. 
 
CONTESTATION AND MULTI-STAKEHOLDERISM IN INTERNATIONAL 
INTERNET POLICY AGENDAS - WSIS AND THE IGF  
 
As noted above, as the 1990s progressed the ITU began to take serious measures to 
reassert itself as an important global institutional player in electronic network 
communications. A significant part of this was to be its attempted role as an agenda 
setter. Whilst the IAHC MoU to which it was a signatory proved a dead-end initiative, 
the decision taken at its 1998 Plenipotentiary meeting to launch a World Summit on 
the Information Society proved more successful, though not without an unexpected 
and important twist. Having received UN approval in 2001, WSIS was organised as a 
two phase event to take place in the North in 2003 (in Geneva) and in the South in 
2005 (in Tunis).  Around the time of WSIS I, it became clear that the summit was 
going to be used as a platform for the rumbling discontent that continued to be felt 
about what was seen as the unilateral control over ICANN held by the US. Here, at 
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one of the preparatory meetings for the summit in February 2003, Internet governance 
„moved quickly into the centre of the political debate‟ (Kleinwachter 2009: 78). WSIS 
thus somewhat unexpectedly became a process in which a debate on developing an 
agreed future global governance system for the Internet, not least the critical technical 
resources around its naming system, assumed a high  - and as it turned out -
controversial profile. Here, the voices of developing economies were strongly 
discernible, a key source of dissatisfaction being the perceived slowness of ICANN at 
creating new English Language Top Level Domains to the exclusion of many new 
Internet users from the South. The Brazilian government expressed concern about a 
potential loss of sovereignty through having to go through ICANN for the creation of 
any new ccTLD. A number of countries from the Arab world were concerned about 
the indirect ability of the US to remove their presence from the Internet should it 
determine to do so. In a different way, a number of other states, notably China, were 
interested in being able to assert more control over users‟ access to the Internet in 
their sovereign territory. 
 
There were two important outcomes from WSIS I in respect of Internet governance. 
First, states agreed to declare that „international management of the Internet should be 
multilateral, transparent and democratic, with the full involvement of governments, 
the private sector, civil society and international organisations. It should ensure an 
equitable distribution of resources, facilitate access for all and ensure a stable and 
secure functioning of the Internet‟ (WSIS 2003a, p.7). Second, WSIS established the 
Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) given the task of producing a 
working definition of Internet governance; highlighting relevant public policy issues 
around Internet governance; and working towards creating a common understanding 
of the roles and responsibilities of a range of public and private actors in Internet 
governance (WSIS 2003b, pp.7– 8). WGIG was interesting in that it contained 20 
governmental and 20 non-governmental members, each afforded equal weight in the 
discussions and decision-making. According to Kleinwachter (2009) this led the 
group to focus less on ideological differences and more on finding solutions 
collectively to the policy problems discussed. WGIG duly produced its report for the 
second phase of WSIS, at which decisions on the future of Internet governance were 
to be taken. The definition produced enunciated that Internet governance was „the 
development and application by Governments the private sector and civil society, in 
their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, 
and programmes that shape the evolution of the Internet‟ (WGIG 2005, p.4).  
 
Whilst the lead up to WSIS II suggested strongly that an important multilateralisation 
of Internet governance, and particularly that related to ICANN, would be agreed the 
reality proved something less substantial for the course of the international policy 
agenda for the Internet. In the months prior to the summit, the US issued a firm 
declaration that its contractual relationship with ICANN would continue into the 
future and that the status of ICANN was not on the agenda for alteration as part of the 
WSIS process. Faced with this clear exercising of material power, and with 
continuing pressure - not least from civil society quarters - for some kind of 
multilateral institutional outcome, states eventually agreed to the creation of a new 
body, the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). The inability to create a new shared 
oversight function for ICANN also yielded the softer agreement to develop so-called 
enhanced cooperation, possibly leading to a „new cooperation model‟, though little or 
nothing in this respect has materialised since the conclusion of WSIS II. 
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In fact, the idea of a forum was championed in WGIG by civil society, technical 
community and academic members (Kleinwachter 2009). The IGF was something of 
an experiment in global governance in that it was designated by the UN as a 
deliberative, multi-stakeholder body in which all participants had in theory an equal 
voice. Meeting annually since 2006 it has the broad remit to discuss Internet policy 
matters, though it does „not replace existing arrangements, mechanisms, institutions 
or organisations…[and is]…constituted as a neutral, non-duplicative and non-binding 
process…with no involvement in day-to-day or technical operations of the Internet‟ 
(WSIS 2005a, p.12).    
 
An important issue is the extent to which the IGF provides a context for the South to 
influence the development of international policy agendas on Internet governance. 
Here, evidence appears to be mixed. It is interesting to note that at WSIS II, states 
resolved to create „enhanced cooperation‟ in Internet governance. This very loose 
term served to embody the aspiration of many states for increased say in the way 
decisions on the way the Internet would evolve were taken. The first two meetings of 
the IGF in Athens in 2006 and Rio 2007, however, were organised such that „the 
management of critical Internet resources in general and the future of ICANN in 
particular came close to being a taboo‟ (Hoffman 2009: 8). Furthermore, the IGF is 
merely deliberative and thus any work that occurs on matters of Internet governance 
is not permitted to result in even the provision of a recommendation, let alone a 
regulatory decision. However, it has been suggested that the cooperation undertaken 
in the IGF has contributed to a general acceptance of key Internet governance 
terminology and has created principles adopted in ICANN‟s new accountability 
framework. Overall, Hoffman (2009: 13) contends that the „unique combination of 
institutional anchoring in the U.N. and experimental multi-stakeholder arrangement 
turns the IGF into a laboratory of transnational coordination that seems to work 
precisely because it does not draw on formal decision-making but the legitimacy of 
the institution‟. 
 
The support of developing states for the creation of the IGF was contingent on their 
expectation that it would have a development agenda, though this has not 
materialised. Instead, development was envisaged as a cross-cutting theme which has 
meant that it has tended to be marginalised (Drake 2009). The IGF has failed to 
undertake any real debate on the activities of other large organisations such as the 
ITU, WTO, ICANN and the OECD in addressing development issues in respect of the 
Internet. However, the Sharm el Sheikh meeting did address development issues in 
the implementation of the WSIS principles and open planning meetings in preparation 
for the 2010 meeting in Vilnius raised development to such an extent that a main 
session on it was included in the programme. There is also some evidence of 
institutional emulation resulting from policy cooperation in the IGF. Here, regional 
IGFs have been formed in Latin America and Africa at the regional level and at the 
national level in Brazil. These IGFs are sites for policy learning but also policy 
coordination in preparation for future global IGF meetings (Klienwachter 2009). 
More broadly, and in respect of those WSIS goals related to development, a recent 
ITU report highlights only moderate progress in some areas  - and very little progress 
in most - in relation to the position of developing economies.  Here, connecting public 
institutions (libraries, cultural centres, museums, post offices and archives) with 
Internet access has produced an equal mix of „medium‟ and „low‟ achievement in key 
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sub-categories. In respect of connecting health centres and hospitals to the Internet, 
attainment has been for the most part „low‟. Whilst provision of Internet access to 
governmental institutions in developing economies has produced „medium‟ progress, 
provision of Internet access to households is „low‟ (ITU 2010: 16-17). With a target 
date of 2015 to achieve the set WSIS goals, much therefore currently remains to be 
done in an environment of likely sluggish global economic growth and reduced public 
spending. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has outlined the development of recent international policy agendas in two 
parts of electronic network communications with very different characteristic features, 
despite their obvious connectedness in functional terms. Policy change in both cases 
has occurred in the context of new technological developments and the attendant 
governance challenges posed in each case. Leading edge technological arenas have 
shown historically very limited capacity for states of the Southern hemisphere to 
shape new and changing global institutional contexts, and telecommunications and the 
Internet are no exceptions. First mover advantage in the global governance of 
electronic network communication continues to reside overwhelmingly with the 
North. This has even proven to be the case in the institutional contexts old and new 
examined in this paper, even those where it might be expected that developing 
economies could exercise a significant the degree of presence in moments of 
contestation. In the development of telecommunications and Internet policy agendas 
in the WTO and ICANN, as might be predicted, the material power and resources of 
key parties from the North has proven decisive. However, perhaps more surprisingly, 
the ITU, since the mid 1990s, has taken a remarkable neo-liberal policy turn which 
has ensured that it maintains its prominence in the global telecommunications 
institutional landscape. In so doing, it has become a key adopter and promoter of the 
agendas of regulated competition in telecommunications led originally by the US and 
the EU and established in the WTO through the mid-to-late 1990s. Thus, in 
international telecommunications, policy agendas are characterised much more by 
regulatory cooperation and learning than regulatory competition (more generally see 
Radaelli 2003). Much the same can be said of the Internet policy context. In the WSIS 
process, the subsequent „soft‟ institutional context of the IGF (despite calls for 
multilateral governance of Internet critical technical resources to be created) produced 
a policy agenda only weakly influenced by the interests of developing economies. 
This is somewhat surprising since the deliberative nature of the IGF might have been 
expected to provide scope for developing economy voices to be heard and agendas to 
be addressed to a greater extent than has been the case. Instead, parties from civil 
society have been more influential, though there is clearly scope for commonality 
between the interests of the latter and the developing world. Hoffman (2009: 12) 
argues that „sceptics suspect that the ostentatious appreciation of the IGF‟s soft 
outputs is a mere pretext to fend off attempts to create a formal international decision 
making authority‟. Even if the status of the IGF remains unchanged, the forum is 
some distance from attaining cooperation involving strong input from developing 
states, of the kind envisaged through forms such as international regulatory webs (see 
Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). 
 
Overall, both the case of telecommunications and the Internet illustrate the broad 
reinforcement of traditional North-South relations, rather than a change to them. This 
leaves considerable policy challenges on at least three fronts, for which there is some 
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potential for progress. First, there is evidence from the North (particularly the EU) 
that the application of the neo-liberal model of telecommunication displays 
considerable variety at the national level. This suggests scope for developing 
economies in particular to tailor their adoption of neo-liberal policy agendas, at least 
to some extent, to national specificities, though it provides little or no capacity for the 
development of any radically alternative policy model. Second, strong efforts should 
be made in the IGF to address specifically the core aspects of development in any 
future policy agendas (see Kleinwachter 2009). Third, it is important for states from 
the South to develop a stronger engagement with ICANN, in particular its 
Governmental Advisory Committee. Finally, as always, international level policy 
decisions resulting in deployment of as many resources as possible in respect of WSIS 
digital divide goals would have a knock on effect on the recipients‟ willingness and 
ability to engage in the development of future international communication policy 
agendas. 
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